This paper studies incentives to invest in "group reputation" when sorne agents are unable to recognize their partners from past interactions ( i. e., anonymity). lt <loes this by embedding the Kreps-Wilson (1982a) model of reputation and entry deterrence in a random-matching game (instead of just looking at isolated bilateral interactions). Examples are presented of how this affects investments in reputation under differing assumptions on how information is shared amongs agents.
l. Introduction
Reputation is often shared among individuals, i.e., the actions of any individual in a given group influence not only how people interact with that individual, but also how they interact with the remaining members of the group. For example, when a customer gets less than satisfactory service from a company's employee, he or she reacts by switching companies, rather than by trying to avoid dealing with the offending employee (nota practica! option, most of the time). In fact, it seems only a slight exageration to claim that practically any easily identifiable group ( ethnic, political, professional, etc.) "shares a reputation" in this general sense.
Of course, what causes a group to "share" a reputation varü~s considerably. In sorne cases, the fact that a member of the group behaves in a certain way might make it more likely that other members of the group will behave in the same way ( e.g ., bad service resulting from lax supervision). In otlier cases, people might quite deliberately retaliate against the collective, so as to induce it to discipline its individual members ( desp ite being able to identify individual offenders).
In yet other cases, it might simply be that outsiders cannot identify individual members within the group. They avoid dealing with the group in arder to avoid dealing with the individuals who provided inadequate service. For example, a person might remember that the driver was mildly alcoholized last t ime she took a cab at a particular comer-stand, yet might have forgot ten who the driver was. She might quite reasonably opt not to patronize the comer-stand at a li , just to be on the safe side.
This paper presents a model of the last class of situations, specifically, a model in which agents are unable to recognize the group members they have interacted with in the past ("anonymity"), and in which, as a consequence, beliefs a bout ex-ante unobservable ch aracteristics ( e.g., propensity to have a few drinks during working hours) attach to the whole group, rather than to individuals. The key issue is whether the members of the group will have incentives to invest in the group 's reputation (which effectively becomes a sort of public good), i.e ., to engage in costly activities in the short' run in arder to influence other agents' beliefs about the unobserV'able characteristics of the gro up in the longer run. Or put ting it in another way, we ask to what extent, if at all , <loes the presence of such "reputational extemalities" lead agents to free ride on each other, and to what extent <loes eventual free-riding interfere with the formation of group reputations of this kind ?
To study the above questions, we embed a repeated entry-deterrence stagegame with imperfect information a la Kreps-Wilson (1982a) in an anonymous random matching game (two long-lived incumbents matched randomly each period with two one-period lived entrants who share their experiences with their successors) . The notion of reputation we work on is Kreps and Wilson 's: en- trants have beliefs about the incumbent 's ty pe ( compulsive fighter or potential compromiser) , which they update according to their predecessors' experience.
Incumbents who are potential compromisers have incentives to fight ( even when this is not the optimal short-run action) in order to convince entrants that they are compulsive fighters, and, thus, deter future entry. The additional twist is that now entrants' succesors are notable to tell apart the incumbent who fought from the incumbent who accommodated, and so will tend to "average" their beliefs. This, in turn, will reduce incumbents incentives to sacrifice current remunerations for future ones (i.e., to deter entry). If moreover, contemporaneous entrants share information ( i. e., both know everything that has occured in the past , rather than only the experiences of their "family"), incumbents might free ride on each others' investments in reputation.
The first part of this paper presents an scenario with infonnation-sharing among contemporaneous entrants (but no information-sharing amongst incumbents, this means that incumbents do not know each other's types), in which for certain parameter constellations ( under which there would be reputation building in Kreps and Wilson) , there wiU not be any here, and this regardless of the horizon of play (in contrast to Kreps and Wilson's classic conclusion that there will always be reputation building given a sufficiently long horizon) . As will become apparent , this is a direct consequence of there being "free-riding" due to information-sharing.
The second part of this paper presents a two-period analysis of what happens when there is information-sharing both by entrants and incumbents (i.e., incumbents now know each other's types). Interestingly, the two-period equilibrium here differs only marginally from the corresponding equilibrium in the Kreps-Wilson model for a whole range of parameter values , suggesting that simultaneous information-sharing by entrants and incumbents might generally help neutralize negative free-riding effects on reputation. By the way, it emphasizes the importance of the exact pattern of information-sharing for the formation of reputations in collective environments.
Finally, one should point out that "anonymity" is a common assumption in both the theoretical and experimental literature. It is often made in random matching models to preclude reputation-building, and more generally, any kind of repeated-game effects. The results in this paper constitute further evidence that this might not always work (see 'Ellison, 1994) . A discussion of the relevant literature and an outlin~ of the remaining sections complete this introductory section .
Literature Discussion
This work draws mainly on the seminal contributions of Kreps and Wilson (1982a) , and Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) 1 . The model used here is actually an extension of the Kreps-Wilson (1982a) model of entry deterrence through reputation. In the present extension, two (one-period lived) entrants are matched each period one-on-one and randomly with two (long-lived) incumbents, instead of one short-lived entrant being matched with the same long-lived incumbent each period, as in Kreps-Wilson. Another difference is that, here, tough incumbents are robots rather than just agents who like to fight. Despite these differences, incentives to invest in reputations arise here in pretty much the same way as in A few words about the choice of approach. Much more general versions of the results in the Kreps-\Vilson paper just mentioned have been obtained by Levine (1989, 1992) using an alternative, rather intuitive and, in a sense, more elegant approach. There are mainly two reasons why I stick to the Kreps-Wilson treatment: the first reason is that the analysis in Fudenberg and Levine's approach, with its focus on deriving a lower bound for the long-lived player's utility in any N ash equilibrium, tends to leave the exact structure of the underlying behavior unclear. The other reason has to do with the nature of the task at hand: it is not at ali clear to me whether their methods can be applied in this environment, as here a long-lived agent by playing his Stackelberg action over and over again cannot hope to eventually convince entrants that this action will be played for sure in the future. At best, he can lead them to expect that this action will be played with probability one half, which equals the probability that an entrant is matched with any given incumbent. This simply because he cannot control the actions of the other long-lived player, and entrants cannot distinguish between incumbents 3 . Though, as mentioned, this paper works with the notion of reputation originating in the work of , for contrast I should mention the literature that conceptualizes reputation as a "norm" in the context of an infinitely repeated game. Papers following this "norm" approach are Dybvig and Spatt (1980) , Klein and Leffier (1981), and Telser (1980) . This latter view of reputation is fully forward-looking, and would not seem to capture the backward-looking element in the intuitive, everyday idea of reputation.
A recent paper that claims to study collective reputations is Tirole (1996) (in fact, the only recent contribution on the subject that 1 am aware of). That paper works with a rather peculiar definition of reputation that does not seem to correspond to either of the two mentioned previously: in Tirole's paper there is neither learning nor repeated strategic interaction ~as it studies a random matching game with a continuum of agents). The Tirole contribution strikes me as a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) , in which the dynamics are driven not by strategic considerations, but by the evolution of a physical state (namely, the probability that an agent might be identified as a cheater). In fact, the most recent precursor of this work is Diamond (1989) . Even though that paper 2 The results obtained in this paper carry over to a seller/ buyer interaction with "fixed prices" in which a seller supplies an item whose quality cannot be ascertained ex-ante by the buyer.
3 As for introducing richer perturbation sets: why should one work wit h t he more complex model, when, as Fudenberg and Levine have shown, the additional complexity does not really affect the way the model works?
<loes not <leal with t he issue of collective reputations per se, it works with an anonymous population which effectively shares a collective reputation. Freeriding is not an issue though, as the population is infinite, and so, individuals decide whether to invest or not in a non-strategic fashion.
Finally, this work draws on the literature on matching-games and bargaining surveyed in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , a nd on the somewhat narrower literature on imperfect information flows in matching games originating in the contributions of Rosenthal (1979) , Kandori (1992) , and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) 4 .
The structure of this paper is as follows. First , the basic matching-game is outlined (Section 3). Then a benchmark case is studied in which incumbents are identifiable. This section basically revisits Kreps and Wilson (1982a) analysis of reputation in the present random matching environment. The fo llowing section presents an example of an equilibrium in which there is no reputation building at ali due to "free-riding" . The final sé'ction shows that, in the T = 2 case, assuming that incumbents know each other types will neutralize such "freeriding", and allow reputations to develop.
. The Mod e l
The game lasts for T periods. Following Kreps-Wilson, I will measure time backwards ( i. e. , T stands for the first period, and 1 for the last). There are 2(1 + T) players. At any given date, there are 4 players alive: 2T-periods-lived incumbents, denoted by capital J's and identified by subscripts 1 or 2; and two one-period-lived entrants, denoted by capital E's, identified by their "cohort" affiliation (more on cohorts in a moment). The entrants are matched randomly with the incumbents each period. The incumbent matched with entrant E will be denoted by I (E) . Matched agents proceed to p lay stage-game 1 or 2 as in
Incumbents might be of one of two types T: "Rational" (R-) or "Tough" (A).
A "rational" incumbent plays stage-game 1, while a "hard-wired" incumbent plays stage-game 2. Note that O < b < 1, a > l. Each entrant initially believes that an incumbent is "rational" with probability PT (R) . I assume incumbents' types are drawn independently from identical distributions. I will denote the probability that both incumbents be rational at time t by Pt (R, R). Incumbents are assumed to know whether they are rational or tough. The entrant's payoffs are as in the diagrams above. The incumbent 's overall payoffs are given by the undiscounted or discounted sum of the payoffs in the stage-games he or she takes part in.
Cohorts of short-lived entrants, of which there will be at most two, in which case they will be identified by superscripts Fl and F2, are sequences of successive generations of entrants that share their "experiences" : An agent 's "experience" as of time t, denoted by X (Ait), is defined to be ali that that agent has observed directly up to and including that period. The objects that might enter an agent 's experience at any given time t, denoted by Xt(A), are given by the actions undertaken at that time in either of the 2 matches, the identities 5 of the agents undertaking those actions, the types ( denoted by T) of the agents ali ve at t (if applicable), as well as the overall matching-pattern (who is matched with whom, E{' / 1 1 or E{'/ h denoted by M Pt)· In order to distinguish between actions of agents whose identities are assumed to be observable and those of agents who cannot be directly recognized, I will adopt the convention of writing, for example, a(E{j ), for the identified action undertaken by an entrant of cohort F j at time t, while the action of, say, an non-identified entrant belonging to that cohort would be written af (Fj) .
Note that entrants experience will only cover objects existing at the time the entrant is alive, while an incumbent 's experience will contain objects at each date t ::; T (so will the experience of a cohort). Also, note that the experience of an agent, even a long-lived one, is not the same thing as that agent's knowledge 6 .
Asan example of how this notation works, take the first situation this paper will look at: one where there are two cohorts of entrants, and each period the current generation of entrants includes at most one n;i.ember of each cohort. Entrants will be assumed not to be a ble to recognize the incumbents they have interacted with in the past, and only be able to see directly what h appens in 5 Note that ali agents have identities (by definition) , but that does not mean they are recognizable, much less that they are "named". A "Name" in practice is simply a device that a llows a player to associate a specifi c history with the identity of the player he or she is interacting with. Note that for this identification ( i. e., to distinguish a player 's record from that of other players) , it is not only necessary that t he player being identified carries a name, but also that it be common knowledge among the players t hat no two players share the same name and that players cannot change their names.
6 For the limited purposes of this paper, 1 find this notation more transparent than the more general partitional formalism conventionally used to describe knowledge. the matches they take part in. The experience at time t of a member of cohort Fj, Xt(E{j) , is then
The experience of the cohort ( on the basis of which individual inferences are actually made) is given by:
The experience as of time t of an incumbent who is assumed not to be able to observe directly the other incumbent's type (no type-sharing) but who (as always in this paper) is assumed to be able to observe what happens in all matches in the economy, as well as, to know the exact matching-pattern at each time and the cohort affiliation of the entrants in each match, satisfies
Let me summarize sorne of the features all the models dealt with here share. Incumbents know which payoff structure obtains (i.e., they know their type), while entrants do not. Also, I will invariably assume that incumbents can observe each others' actions ex-post; in other words, that at every moment they know the full history of the economy (in other words, there will always be experience-sharing between incumbents). Moreover, I will always assume that ali entrants share the same initial beliefs, and that these do not vary across incumbents. Finally, it will be assumed throughout that incumbents can identify the cohort affiliation of entrants. Here, 1 look a t the scenario that has all agents iclentifiab le. This is the case "nearest" to Kreps-Wilson , and, as such, a useful (if rather obvious) b enchmark.
Pure Random Matching: A Benchmark
All agents are identifia ble and there is no experience-sharing among contemporaneous entrants, nor do incumb ents know each other types. In terms of the notation introduced above, the experience of entra nts at time t here can be described as follows
The experience of incumb ents as of t ime t is given by
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium of this game strongly resembles that of Kreps and Wilson: Proposition l. Th e equilibrium strategies and beliefs are exactly as in Kreps and Wilson, except that the con dition guaranteeing reputation formation (from the period-before-last onward} is now (1/2)a > 1 (rath er than a > l}, and entrants will mix with probability l/2a (rather than l/ a). (For a detailed description, see Appendix) .
Proof. The reasoning is, mostly, analogous to Kreps-Wilson's . Two remarks should suffice to show why this is so: 1) The condition ( 1 /2)a > 1 just states that the maximum expected gain at t = 2 (letting t = 1 b e the last period) from deterring entry by fighting, ( 1/2)a , exceeds the cost of doing so, l. If this is so at t = 2, this must be so as well for any t > 2 (no discounting); 2) Since cohorts are "ident ifiable" here, the value function of an incumb ent _can be written as the sum of two independent parts, each giving the expected payoff of interacting with a specific cohort . Moreover, since the incumbents are ident ified, their value functions will not depend on each others' actions. This implies that one can think of this game as 4 independent games, one for each cohort/ incumb ent pairing, and each with payoffs scaled by 1 /2. These "subgames" can be analyzed as simple 1:1 games 7 . Applying to each such "subgame" exactly the same arguments as in Kreps-Wilson, and then putting together t he resulting "sub equilibria" , yields the overall equilibrium described above. 1 7 An intuitive way of seeing t his equivalence is to think of each of t hese games as one where every period an entrant is matched with an incumbent with probability 1/2 or not at a li.
Perhaps the only interesting difference between this environment and KrepsWilson is contained in the following result:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium described in the previous proposition is uniqv.e .
Proof, The on-the-equilibrium-path strategies are unique for the same reasons as in Kreps-Wilson (see Appendix) . Overall uniqueness follows from the consistency requirement in the definition of sequential equilibrium 8 , as it can be shown that this requirement fully determines beliefs off-equilibrium-path. The fact that consistency suffices to pin down beliefs off-equilibrium-path is essentially a consequence of working with automata incumbents, instead of incumbents who "like" to fight .
• Of course, the Kreps-vVilson punchline carries over: As the horizon expands, the critica! beliefs' value separating the entry from the no-entry regions will tend to zero (reputation building).
Corollary 3. As T -+ oo , even a very small initial assessment that an inrnmbent is "hard-wired" will lead to reputation building.
In conclusion: modifying Kreps-Wilson in this way leaves their results practically unchanged, except for the strengthened uniqueness, and the two minor differences pointed out in Proposition l. As these latter features are straightforward consequences of assuming that two cohorts of entrants are each being matched randomly with a different incumbent every period, it seems appropriate to refer to them as "pure random matching effects".
Free-Riding Under Experience Sharing
This section looks at what happens when there is information-sharing among contemporaneous entrants and incumbents cannot observe each others' types (the next section looks at the corresponding scenario when incumbents know each others' types in the •case T = 2). That is, what happens when ali entrants alive at any given time belong to one and the same cohort, while each incumbent ignores the type of the other one.
The section describes a particular class of symmetric equilibria under discounting in which there is no reputation building at ali (for a certain parameter constellation ). The aim is to illustrate a possibility, rather than provide a complete analysis.
Experience Sharing; No Type Sharing
In terms of the notation introduced earlier, this case can be described as follows: The experience at time t of an entrant Ef is given by
The experience of an incumbent h at time t is
Xt(h) = { T (h) , a(Ef ) , a(EI) , a (h), a(!¡) , M Pt}

No Reputation Building Regardless of Horizon in the Presence of Discounting
The purpose of this subsection , it bears repeating, is not to present a full analysis of the formation of reputations when there is experience sharing and payoffs a re discounted. Rather, the aim is to show how free-riding and discounting can give rise to what seems to me to be a very ext reme equilibrium, one in which there are no incentives to invest in reputation regardless of the length of the game (more precisely, in this equilibrium the critica! beliefs separating the entry from the no-entry regions remain constant as T --+ oo).
For this kind of result , discounting is necessary. To see this, note that, by the very nature of the result this section is aiming at, it must a lways b e feasible to convince entrants that incumb ents are tough in the range of (marginal) beliefs [O, b] . For , if the critica! beliefs are not to shift leftward as the horizon expands, accommodation with probability one must be the prescribed action in equilibrium in this region. But then, by deviating and fighting in this range, there is always a positive probability that an incumbent can convince an entrant t hat he is tough. In the absence of discounting, the reward from convincing an entrant that one is tough would go to infinity, and it would eventually be impossible to sustain fighting for sure as an equilibrium action.
It turns out that it is possible in this equilibriam to use t he marginal probability that an incumbent be a compulsive fighter as the state. This because there is no mixing in equilibrium. To understand what is going on here, it seems best to start by looking at a two-period , no-discounting version of this game. The diagram below illustrates t he discussion: In the last period, here, as in all the scenarios iu this paper, nothing changes. In the period before last, starting off from initial beliefs somewhere to the left of 1/ a, the equilibrium prescribes accommodation with probability l. To see that accommodation is a best response here, note that if an incumbent deviates from this action and fights instead, her expected payoff will be given by
For all initial beliefs below 1/ a, this expected payoff will not match the additional cost of fighting , namely 1, making the deviation under consideration unprofitable. On the other hand, for initial beliefs in [O, 1/ a], the net payoff from accommodating is zero. Hence, it is clearly best to do so.
The role of discounting is the following: if incumbents were not to discount, the reward from convincing entrants that incumbents are tough would grow to infinity as the horizon expands, eventually pushing the expected payoff from deviating and fighting above l. To prevent this, it is necessary that incumbents discount their payoffs at a sufficiently high rate, namely, a rate /3 such that
The right hand-side of this expression gives the reward from discouraging entry forever, from next period on (hence the additional /3). The condition guarantees that the beliefs making an incumbent indifferent between deviating-and-fighting or conforming-and-accommodating ( the in verse of the right hand-side expression), always (i.e., for any horizon ) lie to the right of b. In this way, since the expected gain from deviating varies monotonically with initial beliefs, no matter how long the game goes on, it will always remain a best response to accommoclate in the region [O , b] .
Note that there is free-ricling here because what the other incumbent is doing contemporaneously is modifying the way this incumbent 's current actions infiuence the beliefs of entrants. In fact, it is this feature that makes accommodation with probability one a feasible equilibrium action.
Finally, note that in the 1:1 setup if j3a/(1 -/3) < 1, there will not be reputation building from the start on as well. The reason is simply that fighting is too costly to ever justify investing in reputations. That is not what is going on here: it is being explicitly assumed that j3a > 1 (which imp]ies that j3a/( 1-f3) > 1) 9
Reputation D espite Free-Riding
The experience set of an incumbent h at time t is now given by
while the experience of entrants is as in the preceding section.
When incumbents are aware of each others' types, the computation of an equilibrium becomes more involved: Incumbents' strategies depend now on profiles of types, in addition to beliefs ancl time. Moreover, thc formulas for updating beliefs become considerably more complicated, as entrnnts 11ow have to "average" out ali states (profiles of types) under which an observed profile of actions might have arisen.
For these reasons, I study here only the T = 2 case. This allows me to use the marginal probability that an incumbent be tough in describing an equilibrium. Even though the equilibria presented will be recursive in such magnitucle 10 , they remain considerably less transparent than those encountered befo re.
Again, I repeat that the aim of this sub'section is to. suggest an interesting possibility ( that sufficiently widespread information-sharing might neutralize the free-riding problem) rather than provide definitive answers. For a precise description of the equilibrium and a proof of the proposition, the reader is again referred to the Appendix. The first thing to note is that there is still free-riding here. Take the state (R, R) (i.e., both incumbents are rational), and initial beliefs below b. Under these conditions, it is equilibrium behavior for an incumbent to accommodate for sure. The reason being that unilateral fighting cannot succeed in convincing an entrant that incumbents are tough. More precisely: The incumbent realizes that should she deviate and fight, the entrant will observe the outcome (F, AC) ( i. e., one incumbent fights; the other accommodates). According to the equilibrium, this outcome should only arise if the state is (R, A) . Hence, after observing (F, AC) , the entrant will assign probability 1/2 to the event that án incumbent is tough. But this belief is not high enough to deter entry the following period (as b > 1/ 2).
Note further that in the equilibria described, when the state is (R, R), incumbents accommodate entry throughout the range of beliefs [O, b] , while in the Kreps-Wilson game they would have fought entry with positive probability.
On the other hand, when the state is (R, A), incumbents will, at any given beliefs in this range, fight with a higher probability than they would in the Kreps-Wilson environment. These two circumstances tend to shift the critica! beliefs in opposite directions , so that , without further arguments, is ha rd to say whether the critica! b eliefs will be above or below those in Kreps-Wilson. But the following diagram makes plain that beliefs will never be above the Kreps-Wilson value.
Interestingly, there will be a value of b, namely, b*, at which there will be no "loss" in reputation relative to Kreps-Wilson. Also, as this parameter takes values near one, the loss in reputation becomes negligible. Although , for any value of b, the loss in reputation will be relatively small. It would seem that the additional information-sharing among incumbents allows them to better coordina te their responses, and thus avoid the extreme form of free-riding which led to the drastic result of the previous section (fighting can now be sustained when the state is (R, A) , precisely because the rational incumbent can now be sure that the other incumbent will not accommodate).
The issue of uniqueness is left open. Note that it is not even clear whether the equilibrium presented here is unique among the class of recursive equilibria.
Final Remarks
The two main results of this paper (Propositions 4 and 5) show that it might be misleading to analyze reputation formation in one-on-one environments since the exact pattern of information-sha ring will be crucial in molding incentives to invest in a reputation ip. collective setups as the one considered here. Experience-sharing among contemporaneous entrants in the absence of typesharing generates free-riding , but type-sharing accompanied by experiencesharing would seem to neutralize the ad verse effects of the resulting free-riding.
Of course, what I have done here is to illustrate possibilities. A more general analysis is outstanding. For (1/2)a > 1, the following strategies and beliefs forma sequential _ equilibrium of the matching game just described:
Starting from given initial beliefs PT, define beliefs recursively as follows : a) If there is no entry at stage t + 1, then Pt = Pt+I· b) If there is entry at stage t + 1, this entry is fought , and Pt+l > O, then Pt = max(bn , Pt+1) . e) If there is entry at stage t+ 1, and either this entry is met by accommodation
The rational incumbent's strategy is given by:
If t = 1, the incumbent accommodates. If t > 1 and Pt 2 bt-l, the incumbent fights. If t > 1 and Pt < bt-l, the incumbent fights with probability (1 -bt-l) ptf (1 -Pt) bt-l, and accommodates with the complementary probability.
The entrant's strategy is given by:
If Pt > b, entrant stays out. If Pt < b, then entrant enters. If Pt = bt, then entrant stays out with probability (1/2)a .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
I present the argument for the two period case. Sinc8' the equilibrium is stationary, generalizing the result to longer. horizons is straightforward. This is the equilibrium (with the last period corresponding to t =O): (F, AC) : It follows that 81 = (1/2)82 as now both tough and rational incumbents are supposed to fight, and deviations a re taken to be uncoordinated. This is an out-of-equilibrium ou tcome, yet the consistency requirement in the definition of sequential equ ilibrium suffices to pin down beliefs. Notice also that this equil ib ri um is not unique.
There is another equilibrium that has incumbents fighting with probability 1 for beliefs above b, for all t . The path of play, though, is the same in both equilibria. Besides there are yet other equilibria in which there is mixing in the region [O, b] .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The equilibrium assessment is as follows: 
where b* is subject to 1 - 
Given that there is accommodation by R when the state is (R, R) , we have
solving for x satisfying this equation, and denoting such an x by x, we get
Note that x (b) is increasing in 82. Now, define 8 by setting to get _ _ (1,,..,.-_b)_8_ = 1 (1 -8)(2b -l) ,
All 8~ > 5 (b) will yield x > l; ·ali 82 :::; 8 (b) will result in x < l. For 8 2 < 8 (b), x < 1, and so, if a rational incumbent fights with probability 1, we get x > x, and, hence,
. It follows that it <loes not pay to fight. If, instead, the incumbent accommodates with probability 1, this would imply that, Hence deterring entry.
Entrant:
At T = 2, in the region [O, b] , the probability that an entrant is fought (across ali states) is given by the solution to the following equation (which must hold if the expected value of entry is to be O):
Substituting
(1-b)8
(1 -8) (2b -1) for x above, solving for 82, and picking the positive root, one obtains .l. 
